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 1. Introduction
This paper is a methodological contribution to the empirical investigation of decision
making under risk and under uncertainty. At least since Allais (1953), there has been a large
literature developing models of choice under risk or under uncertainty that seek to give a
better account of observed behavior than the expected utility (EU) model. An empirical
literature that tests the EU and other models on experimental data has also emerged along-
side these theoretical developments. These experiments often employ elicitation procedures
in which subjects are in effect making repeated choices between two risky or uncertain out-
comes; the data obtained in this way consist of a finite number of binary choices, which can
then be used to partially recover a subject’s preference. A more recent strand of experiments
employs a different elicitation procedure, which we shall call the budgetary choice procedure.
In this case subjects are asked to choose a preferred option from a potentially infinite set
of alternatives. For example, a subject could be presented with a portfolio problem where
she has to allocate her budget between two assets with state-contingent payoffs. An early
and influential experiment of this type, the data from which we analyze in this paper, is
Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007).1 Other examples include Loomes (1991), Gneezy
and Potters (1997), Bayer et al. (2013), Choi et al. (2014), Ahn et al. (2014), Hey and Pace
(2014), Cappelen et al. (2015), and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2016).
The main contribution of this paper is to develop an empirical test that could be used to
analyze data collected from portfolio decisions; it is applicable to experimental data where a
budgetary choice elicitation procedure is employed and also to suitable non-experimental or
field data. Our test allows us to determine whether a data set is consistent with the EU model
or some of its generalizations, without making parametric assumptions on the Bernoulli index
or other features of the model. It is worth noting that models of decision making over time
(such as the discounted utility model), as well as models of decision making involving both
time and risk, are formally very similar to the EU model and its generalizations. Budgetary
choice procedures are increasingly used in experiments for studying these types of models,2
and budgetary choices involving time preferences may occur naturally in the field as well; it
1 See this paper also for an account of the advantages of such an approach.
2 See Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and, for a comprehensive list of papers employing such procedures
to study time preferences, Imai and Camerer (2016).
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 is clear that the tests developed in this paper could be used with little or no modification in
these contexts.
1.1 Testing EU and other models on a finite lattice
A feature of the budgetary choice procedure, and a reason why it is sometimes favored
over binary choice procedures, is that instead of requiring the subject to pick one alternative
or another, it allows her to calibrate her response and pick something ‘in between.’ But this
feature is also the crucial reason why a new empirical tool is needed to analyze nonpara-
metrically data collected from a budgetary procedure, whereas no such method is necessary
for binary choices. Indeed, suppose we make a finite number of observations, where at ob-
servation t an agent chooses a lottery that gives a monetary payoff xts in state s over one
that gives yts in state s (for s “ 1, 2, . . . , s¯), where the probability of state s is known to
be pis ą 0. Imagine that we would like to test if this data set is consistent with the EU
model. Ignoring the issue of errors for the time being, checking for consistency with the EU
model simply involves finding a strictly increasing Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R such thatřs¯
s“1 pisupxtsq ě
řs¯
s“1 pisupytsq holds at every observation t. This amounts to solving a finite
set of linear inequalities, and it is computationally straightforward to ascertain if a solution
exists. However, it is clear that this method is no longer applicable when choices are instead
made from a classical budget sets at every observation t, since even a single observed choice
from a budget set reveals an infinite set of binary preferences.
The empirical test that we develop for solving this problem is very simple, and it is worth
giving a short explanation here. Consider a data set with three observations and two states,
as depicted in Figure 1. The subject chooses the contingent consumption bundle p2, 5q from
budget set B1, p6, 1q from B2, and p4, 3q from B3. Assuming that the probability of state s
is commonly known to be pis, consistency with the EU model would require the existence of
a strictly increasing Bernoulli function u such that pi1up2q`pi2up5q ě pi1upxq`pi2upyq for all
px, yq in B1, and similarly at the other two observations.
In our main methodological result (Theorem 1), we show that this data set can be ratio-
nalized by the EU model if it can be rationalized on an appropriately modified consumption
set. Specifically, let X be the set of consumption levels that are observed to have been cho-
sen at some observation and in some state, plus zero; in this example X “ t0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6u.
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 Figure 1: Constructing the finite lattice
Then for the data set to be EU-rationalizable, it is sufficient (and obviously necessary) for
it to be EU-rationalizable on the reduced consumption set X 2, i.e., there is an increasing
function u¯ : X Ñ R such that the expected utility of p2, 5q is greater than any other bundle
in B1XX 2, and so forth. The set X 2 is a finite lattice, depicted by the open circles in Figure
1. Therefore, checking for EU-rationalizability involves checking if there is a solution to a
finite set of linear inequalities, a problem which is computationally feasible.3
This lattice method turns out to be very flexible: it can be used not just to check for
EU-rationalizability, but also for consistency with other models of choice under risk (such as
the rank dependent utility (RDU) model (Quiggin, 1982)) and under uncertainty (such as
the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989)). The basic idea is always
to convert an infinite collection of revealed preference pairs into a finite number involving
only bundles on a finite lattice. Note also that the method does not require linear budget
sets: it works for any type of constraint set, so long as it is compact.
1.2 Empirical implementation and findings
We implement our empirical method on a data set obtained from the well known portfolio
3 This example is EU-rationalizable on X 2 and thus EU-rationalizable. One solution is u¯p0q “ 0, u¯p1q “ 1,
u¯p2q “ 4, u¯p3q “ 6, u¯p4q “ 7, u¯p5q “ 8, and u¯p6q “ 9.
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 choice experiment in Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007), in order to demonstrate that the
lattice method works at a practical level, and also for its own sake. In this experiment, each
subject was asked to purchase Arrow-Debreu securities under different budget constraints.
There were two states of the world, and it was commonly known that states occurred either
symmetrically (each with probability 1/2) or asymmetrically (one with probability 1/3 and
the other with probability 2/3). In their analysis, Choi et al. (2007) first checked whether a
subject’s observations were consistent with the maximization of a locally nonsatiated utility
function by performing the familiar GARP test (prescribed by Afriat’s (1967) Theorem).
Those subjects who passed or came sufficiently close to passing GARP were then fitted to
a parametric version of the disappointment aversion (DA) model (Gul, 1991), which is a
special case of the RDU model when there are two states of the world.
The lattice method developed in this paper makes it possible for us to evaluate other
models of choice under risk (beyond basic utility maximization) using a completely nonpara-
metric approach. We test whether a subject’s choices are consistent with the EU, DA, and
RDU models by applying the lattice method. We also test for consistency with the maxi-
mization of a utility function that is stochastically monotone, in the sense that if a bundle
dominates another with respect to first order stochastic dominance, then it must have higher
utility. The EU, DA, and RDU models are all special cases of the SMU model, which is in
turn more stringent than basic utility maximization.
With 50 observations collected on each subject, it is unsurprising that hardly any subject
would be exactly rationalizable by even the the most permissive model of utility maximiza-
tion. It is possible to quantify a data set’s departure from a particular notion of rationality
using the critical cost efficiency index (Afriat (1972, 1973)); this index is widely used in the
empirical revealed preference literature, including Choi et al. (2007).4 This index runs from
1 to 0, with the index equal to 1 if the data set passes the test exactly. We adopt the same
measure of rationality in this paper. Given the data obtained from a particular subject, and
for each of the models that we consider, it is possible to calculate this index; in the case of
the EU, DA, and RDU models, this calculation again relies upon the lattice method.
4 For a recent paper that implements a variant of this index and discusses its merits, see Halevy, Persitz,
and Zrill (2016).
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 In comparing the performance of different models, it is necessary to go beyond comparing
(approximate) pass rates since a very permissive model will have a very high pass rate but also
little restrictive and predictive power. A standard way of measuring power in the empirical
revealed preference literature is to estimate the probability of a randomly generated data set
failing the test for a given model (Bronars, 1987); a model has high power if this probability
is high. When one is investigating nested models, it is also natural to examine relative power:
for example, if we randomly select a data set which passes GARP, what is the probability
that it is also consistent with the EU model? Even though the power of different models
of choice under risk has been investigated in other contexts, we provide the first systematic
investigation of this issue in the context of budgetary choice data.
So models can be compared in at least two dimensions: their pass rates and their power.
One way of combining these into a single index is to evaluate the difference between the
pass rate and the model’s precision, which is the probability of a random data set passing
the test for that model (in other words, 1 minus the power). Selten (1991) provides an
axiomatization of this index and calls it the index of predictive success. We evaluate the
performance of different models according to this index.
The following is a brief summary of our empirical findings:5
• At a cost efficiency threshold of 0.9, more than 80% of subjects pass GARP and are
therefore consistent with the maximization of a locally nonsatiated utility function.
• Among this group of subjects more than half are rationalizable by the EU model.
• The SMU and RDU models explain a sizable proportion of subjects whose behavior is
not captured by the EU model. This is not true of the DA model, even though it is in
principle a more permissive model than EU.
• If we randomly generate a data set which passes GARP, the probability of it being
consistent with the RDU model, and hence the more stringent DA and EU models,
is effectively zero. In other words, the power of these models is close to perfect, even
among subjects who are consistent with utility maximization.
• After conditioning on passing GARP, the SMU and RDU models have the highest
5 These findings are broadly consistent with results from earlier studies (see Section 4 for details).
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 indices of predictive success. These models perform well because they capture signifi-
cantly more of the population than the EU model, without sacrificing power.
1.3 Relationship with the revealed preference literature
Our paper is related to the revealed preference literature originating from Afriat’s (1967)
Theorem, which characterizes consumer demand observations that are consistent with the
maximization of a locally nonsatiated utility function (see also Diewert (1973) and Varian
(1982)). Afriat’s Theorem has theoretical significance in the sense that its intuitive behavioral
characterization of basic rationalizability (through GARP) provides a justification for utility
maximization in the consumer demand context, but it also provides a viable empirical method
for testing rationalizability, which is why it has given rise to a large empirical literature.
A natural follow up to Afriat’s contribution is to characterize those data sets which
are rationalizable by more specialized utility functions. Among these papers are those which
characterize observations of contingent consumption demand that are consistent with the EU
model and (in more recent papers) some of its generalizations; these include Varian (1983a,
1983b, 1988), Green and Srivastava (1986), Diewert (2012), Bayer et al. (2013), Echenique
and Saito (2015), Chambers, Liu, and Martinez (2016), and Chambers, Echenique, and Saito
(2016).6 The principal difference between our results and this literature is that we do not
rely on the methods of convex optimization; this means, in particular, that we do not require
(or guarantee) the concavity of the Bernoulli function, and our results are applicable to data
sets with general constraint sets rather than just linear budget sets. For reasons which we
make clear later in the paper, the fact that we allow for nonlinear constraint sets means that
our method can also be used to calculate Afriat’s efficiency index.
It is worth mentioning that not all revealed preference results (involving budgetary ob-
servations) that flow from Afriat’s Theorem have the feature of providing both theoretical
insight and an empirical method. There are papers where the emphasis is on providing a
characterization that offers theoretical insight; in other cases the emphasis is on providing
an empirically viable method of model testing.7 Our main methodological result (Theorem
6 There is also a closely related literature on recovering expected utility from asset or contingent con-
sumption demand functions, where, in effect the data set is assumed to be infinite (see, for example, Dybvig
and Polemarchakis (1981) and Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014)).
7 For example, Chambers, Liu, and Martinez (2016) provides a characterization of the former type, and
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 1) says that, for a broad class of models, to check for rationalizability it suffices to check for
rationalizabilty as if the subject’s consumption space is some finite lattice (constructed from
the data). By itself, the result does not furnish us with any theoretical motivation for one
model or another; its principal value is in providing us with an empirical tool.
1.4 Organization of the paper
Section 2 provides a description of the lattice method and explains how it can be used to
test the EU, DA, and RDU models in a budgetary choice environment. Further applications
of the lattice method, including to models of decision making under uncertainty, can be
found in the Online Appendix. In Section 3 we explain Afriat’s efficiency index and how the
lattice method can be used to calculate this index. The empirical application to the portfolio
choice data collected by Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007) can be found in Section 4.
2. The lattice method
We assume that there is a finite set of states, denoted by S “ t1, 2, . . . , s¯u. The contingent
consumption space is Rs¯`; for a typical consumption bundle x P Rs¯`, the sth entry, xs, specifies
the consumption level in state s.8 There are T observations in the data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1;
by this we mean that the agent is observed choosing the bundle xt from Bt Ă Rs¯`. We assume
that Bt is compact and that xt P BBt, where BBt denotes the upper boundary of Bt.9 The
most important example of Bt is the classical linear budget set under complete markets, i.e.,
Bt “ tx P Rs¯` : pt ¨ x ď pt ¨ xtu, (1)
with pt " 0 denoting the vector of state prices. In this case, we may also write the data set
as O “ tpxt,ptquTt“1. The experiment conducted by Choi et al. (2007), the data from which
we analyze in Section 4, involves subjects choosing from linear budget sets.
they point out this distinction clearly in the introduction to their paper.
8 Our results do depend on the realization in each state being one-dimensional (which can be interpreted
as a monetary payoff, but not a bundle of goods). This case is the one most often considered in applications
and experiments and is also the assumption in a number of recent papers, including Kubler, Selden, and
Wei (2014), Echenique and Saito (2015), and Chambers, Echenique, and Saito (2016). The papers by Varian
(1983a, 1983b), Green and Srivastava (1986), Bayer et al. (2013), and Chambers, Liu, and Martinez (2016)
allow for multi-dimensional realizations but (like the three aforementioned papers) they also require the
convexity of the agent’s preference over contingent consumption and linear budget sets.
9 An element y P Bt is in BBt if there is no x P Bt such that x ą y. (For the vectors x, y P Rs¯, we write
x ě y if xs ě ys for all s, and x ą y if x ě y and x ‰ y. If xs ą ys for all s, we write x " y.) For example,
if Bt “ tpx, yq P R2` : px, yq ď p1, 1qu, then p1, 1q P BBt but p1, 1{2q R BBt.
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 Bear in mind, however, that our formulation only requires Bt to be compact and, in
particular, it does not have to be a linear budget set. A crucial application requiring Bt to
be nonlinear is found in Section 3, where we define approximate rationalizability. Another
natural example of a nonlinear budget set is when a subject chooses contingent consumption
through a portfolio of securities in an incomplete market; in this case, the budget set will be
compact so long as the security prices do not admit arbitrage.10
Let tφp¨, tquTt“1 be a collection of functions, where φp¨, tq : Rs¯` Ñ R is continuous and
strictly increasing.11 The data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is said to be rationalizable by tφp¨, tquTt“1
if there exists a continuous and strictly increasing function u : R` Ñ R`, which we shall
refer to as the Bernoulli function, such that
φpupxtq, tq ě φpupxq, tq for all x P Bt, (2)
where upxq “ pupx1q, upx2q, . . . , upxs¯qq. In other words, xt maximizes φpupxq, tq in Bt. It is
natural to require u to be strictly increasing since we typically interpret its argument to be
money. The requirements on u guarantee that φpup¨q, tq is continuous and strictly increasing
in x. Note that continuity is an important property because it guarantees that the agent’s
utility maximization problem always has a solution on a compact constraint set.12
Expected utility. This model clearly falls within the framework we have set up. In-
deed, suppose that both the observer and the agent know that the probability of state s at
observation t is pits ą 0. If the agent is maximizing expected utility (EU),
φpu1, u2, . . . , us¯, tq “
s¯ÿ
s“1
pitsus, (3)
and (2) requires that
s¯ÿ
s“1
pitsupxtsq ě
s¯ÿ
s“1
pitsupxsq for all x P Bt, (4)
10 Indeed, there is pt " 0 such that Bt “ tx P Rs¯` : pt ¨ x ď pt ¨ xtu X tZ ` ωu, where Z is the span of
assets available to the agent and ω is the agent’s endowment of contingent consumption. Both Bt and xt
will be known to the observer, if he knows the asset prices, the agent’s holding of securities, the asset payoffs
in every state, and the agent’s endowment of contingent consumption ω.
11 By strictly increasing, we mean that φpz, tq ą φpz1, tq if z ą z1.
12 The existence of a solution is obviously important if we are to make out-of-sample predictions. More
fundamentally, a hypothesis that an agent is choosing a utility-maximizing bundle implicitly assumes that
the utility function is such that an optimum exists for a reasonably broad class of constraint sets.
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 i.e., the expected utility of xt is greater than that of any other bundle in Bt. When there
exists a Bernoulli function u such that (4) holds, we say that the data set is EU-rationalizable
with the probability weights tpituTt“1, where pit “ ppit1, pit2, . . . , pits¯q.
If O is rationalizable by tφp¨, tquTt“1, then since the objective function φpup¨q, tq is strictly
increasing in x, the rationalizability condition (2) could be strengthened to
φpupxtq, tq ě φpupxq, tq for all x P Bt, (5)
where Bt is the downward extension of Bt, i.e.,
Bt “ ty P Rs¯` : y ď x for some x P Btu.
Furthermore, the inequality in (5) is strict whenever x P BtzBBt (where BBt refers to the
upper boundary of Bt). We define X “ tx1 P R` : x1 “ xts for some t, su Y t0u; besides zero,
X contains those levels of consumption that are chosen at some observation and in some
state. Since the data set is finite, so is X . Given X , we may construct L “ X s¯, which
consists of a finite grid of points in Rs¯`; in formal terms, L is a finite lattice. Let u¯ : X Ñ R`
be the restriction of the Bernoulli function u to X . Given O, the following must hold:
φpu¯pxtq, tq ě φpu¯pxq, tq for all x P Bt X L and (6)
φpu¯pxtq, tq ą φpu¯pxq, tq for all x P `BtzBBt˘X L, (7)
where u¯pxq “ pu¯px1q, u¯px2q, . . . , u¯pxs¯qq. Our main theorem says the converse is also true.13
Theorem 1. Suppose that for some data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 and collection of continuous
and strictly increasing functions tφp¨, tquTt“1, there is a strictly increasing function u¯ : X Ñ
R` that satisfies conditions (6) and (7). Then there is a Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R`
that extends u¯ and guarantees the rationalizability of O by tφp¨, tquTt“1.14
13 Note that Bt cannot be replaced with Bt in (6) and (7). For example, suppose there are two observa-
tions, where x1 “ p1, 0q is chosen from B1 “ tpx1, x2q P R2` : 2x1 ` x2 “ 2u and x2 “ p0, 1q is chosen from
B2 “ tpx1, x2q P R2` : x1`2x2 “ 2u. This pair of observations cannot be rationalized by any increasing utility
function (even though the ‘budget sets’ are just lines) and, in particular, cannot be rationalized in the sense
of Theorem 1 (with φ constant across t). However, since L “ tp0, 0q, p0, 1q, p1, 0q, p1, 1qu, B1 X L “ tp1, 0qu
and B2 X L “ tp0, 1qu, so conditions (6) and (7) are vacuous. On the other hand `B1zBB1˘ X L contains
p0, 1q and `B2zBB2˘ X L contains p1, 0qu, so (7) requires φpu¯px1qq ą φpu¯px2qq and φpu¯px1qq ă φpu¯px2qq,
which plainly cannot happen. This allows us to conclude, correctly, that the data set is not rationalizable.
14 The increasing assumptions on φ and u¯ ensure that we may confine ourselves to checking (6) and (7)
for undominated elements of BtXL, i.e., x P BtXL such that there does not exist x1 P BtXL with x ă x1.
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 What Theorem 1 achieves is domain reduction: checking the rationalizability of O is
equivalent to checking rationalizability in the case where the agent’s consumption space is
considered to be L rather than Rs¯`, which (crucially) reduces the rationality requirements
to a finite number of inequalities, each involving the observed choice and an alternative (see
(6) and (7)), and with the Bernoulli function defined on X rather than R`.
The intuition for Theorem 1 ought to be strong. Given u¯ satisfying (6) and (7), we
can define the step function uˆ : R` Ñ R` where uˆprq “ u¯ prrsq, with rrs being the largest
element of X weakly lower than r, i.e., rrs “ max tr1 P X : r1 ď ru. Notice that φpuˆpxtq, tq “
φpu¯pxtq, tq and, for any x P Bt, φpuˆpxq, tq “ φpu¯prxsq, tq, where rxs “ prx1s, rx2s, . . . , rxs¯sq in
Bt X L. Clearly, if u¯ obeys (6) and (7) then O is rationalized by tφp¨, tquTt“1 and uˆ (in the
sense that (2) holds). This falls short of the claim in the theorem only because uˆ is neither
continuous nor strictly increasing; the proof in the Appendix shows how one could in fact
construct a Bernoulli function with these additional properties.
2.1 Testing the expected utility model
Theorem 1 provides us with a very convenient way of testing EU-rationalizability. The
theorem tell us that O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is EU-rationalizable with the probability weights
tpituTt“1 if and only if there is a collection of real numbers tu¯prqurPX such that
0 ď u¯pr1q ă u¯prq whenever r1 ă r, (8)
and the inequalities (6) and (7) hold, where φp¨, tq is defined by (3). This is a linear program
and it is both formally solvable (in the sense that there is an algorithm that can decide within
a known number of steps whether or not there is a solution to this set of linear inequalities)
and also computationally feasible.
At this point it is worth emphasizing that requiring a data set to be EU-rationalizable is
certainly more stringent than simply requiring it to be rationalizable by a locally nonsatiated
utility function. Indeed, while a data set with a single observation pxt,ptq must be consistent
with the maximization of a strictly increasing (and hence locally nonsatiated) utility function,
even a single observation can be incompatible with the EU model.
Example 1. Suppose that there are two equiprobable states of the world, and at the
price vector pt “ ppt1, pt2q such that pt1 ą pt2, the agent purchases a bundle xt such that
11
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 xt1 ą xt2. We claim that this is not EU-rationalizable, or in other words, the agent cannot
buy strictly more of the more expensive good. Indeed, such an observation is not compatible
with the maximization of any symmetric and strictly increasing utility function on R2`: with
symmetry, the bundle py1, y2q, where y1 “ xt2 and y2 “ xt1, is strictly cheaper than xt but
gives the same utility, so xt is not optimal. Such an observation will also fail the lattice test,
since py1, y2q is in LX pBtzBBtq but the condition (7) is not satisfied. l
On the other hand, our test is strictly less stringent than a test of EU-rationalizability that
also requires the Bernoulli function to be concave (such as Green and Srivastava (1986));
imposing concavity on the Bernoulli function has observable implications over and above
those which flow simply from the EU model, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 2. Suppose an agent maximizes expected utility and has the Bernoulli function
upyq “ py ´ 4q3, which is strictly concave for y ă 4 and strictly convex otherwise.15 There
are two states of the world, which occur with equal probability. At pt “ p1, 3{2q and with
wealth 1, the agent chooses x1 P r0, 1s to maximize fpx1q “ px1 ´ 4q3 ` r2p1´ x1q{3´ 4s3.
Over this range, the Bernoulli function is strictly concave and so is f ; one could check that
f 1p1q ă 0 so that there is unique interior solution which we denote xt (see Figure 2).16 At
the prices pt
1 “ p1, 1q with wealth equal to 64, the agent chooses x1 P r0, 64s to maximize
gpx1q “ px1 ´ 4q3 ` p60´ x1q3 . It is straightforward to check that g is strictly convex on
r0, 64s and it is thus maximized at the two end points p0, 64q and p64, 0q.
Now consider a data set consisting of two observations: the bundle xt chosen at pt “
p1, 3{2q and xt1 “ p64, 0q chosen at pt1 “ p1, 1q. This data set is EU-rationalizable and it will
pass the lattice test, but it cannot be rationalized by a concave Bernoulli function. Indeed,
upxt1q ` upxt2q ě up1q ` up0q (9)
since p1, 0q is affordable to the agent when xt is chosen. If we further assume that u is concave,
up1q´ upxt1q ě up64q´ upxt1` 63q; substituting this into (9), we obtain upxt1` 63q` upxt2q ě
up64q ` up0q. The bundle ppxt1 ` 63q, xt2q is strictly cheaper than xt1 “ p64, 0q at pt1 (see
Figure 2), so xt
1
cannot be optimal. To conclude, while O “ tppt,xtq, ppt1 ,xt1qu is indeed
15 A Bernoulli function with a concave region followed by a convex region is used by Friedman and Savage
(1948, Figure 2) to explain why an agent can simultaneously buy insurance and accept risky gambles.
16 Solving the (quadratic) first order condition gives xt « p0.83, 0.11q.
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 Figure 2: EU-rationalizable but not concave EU-rationalizable data set
EU-rationalizable, it is not EU-rationalizable with a concave Bernoulli function. l
We have shown that a data set is EU-rationalizable if and only if it is EU-rationalizable
on L and the latter is in turn equivalent to the existence of a function u¯ obeying conditions
(6), (7), and (8) (with φpu, tq “ řs¯s“1 pitsus). Conditions (6) and (7) generate a finite list
of preference pairs between some chosen bundle xt and another bundle x in Bt X L or`
BtzBBt˘XL. Condition (8) can also be reformulated as saying that the bundle pr, r, . . . , rq
is strictly preferred to pr1, r1, . . . , r1q whenever r ą r1, for r, r1 P X . We gather these together
in a list tpaj,bjquMj“1, where for all j ď N (with N ăM), the bundle aj is weakly preferred
to bj (so the pairs are drawn from (6)) and for j ą N , aj is strictly preferred to bj (so the
pairs are drawn from (7) and (8)). Each bundle aj can be written in its lottery form aˆj,
where aˆj is the vector with |X | entries, with the ith entry giving the probability of ith ranked
number in X ; similarly, bj can be written in its lottery form bˆj. For example, in the example
given in the introduction, X “ t0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6u and the two states are equiprobable, so the
bundle p2, 5q chosen from B1 has the lottery form p0, 0, 1{2, 0, 0, 1{2, 0q.
We know from Fishburn (1975) that the list tpaj,bjquMj“1 is rationalizable by EU (i.e.,
there is u¯ that solves (6), (7), and (8) with φpu, tq “ řs¯s“1 pitsus) if and only if there does not
13
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 exist λj with
řM
j“1 λ
j “ 1, λj ě 0 for all j, and λj ą 0 for some j ą N , such that
Mÿ
j“1
λjaˆj “
Mÿ
j“1
λjbˆj. (10)
This condition is very intuitive: assuming that the agent has a preference over lotteries, the
independence axiom says that the lottery
řM
j“1 λ
jaˆj must be strictly preferred to
řM
j“1 λ
jbˆj,
and therefore (10) is excluded.17 Put another way, a violation of Fishburn’s condition must
imply a violation of the independence axiom.
To summarize, we have shown that a data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is EU-rationalizable
with probability weights tpituTt“1 if and only if it is EU-rationalizable with probability weights
tpituTt“1 on the domain L and this in turn holds if and only if the preference pairs on L (as
revealed by the data) do not contain a contradiction of the independence axiom of the form
(10). Example 3, to be explained later in the paper, gives an example of a data set which
violates Fishburn’s condition on L and is therefore not EU-rationalizable.
2.2 Other applications of the lattice method
So far, we have considered tests of EU-rationalizability in the case where the probability
of each state is known to both the agent and the observer. The testing procedure extends
to the case where no objective probabilities can be attached to each state. A data set O “
tpxt, BtquTt“1 is rationalizable by subjective expected utility (SEU) if there exist probability
weights pi “ ppi1, pi2, . . . , pis¯q " 0, with řs¯s“1 pis “ 1, and a Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R`
such that, for all t “ 1, 2, . . . , T ,
s¯ÿ
s“1
pisupxtsq ě
s¯ÿ
s“1
pisupxsq for all x P Bt.
In this case, φ is independent of t and instead of being fixed, it is required to belong to
the family of functions ΦSEU such that φ P ΦSEU if φpuq “ řs¯s“1 pisus for some pi " 0. By
Theorem 1, the data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 can be rationalized by some φ P ΦSEU if there is a
strictly increasing u¯ such that (6) and (7) holds and it is clear that these conditions are also
17 To be precise, suppose that the agent has a preference over lotteries with prizes in X . The independence
axiom says that if lottery aˆ is preferred (strictly preferred) to bˆ, then γaˆ ` p1 ´ γqcˆ is preferred (strictly
preferred) to γbˆ` p1´ γqcˆ, where cˆ is another lottery and γ P r0, 1s. Repeated application of this property
and the transitivity of the preference will guarantee that
řM
j“1 λj aˆj is strictly preferred to
řM
j“1 λjbˆj .
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 necessary. These conditions form a system of bilinear inequalities with unknowns tpisus¯s“1
and tu¯prqurPX .
For many of the standard models of decision making under risk or uncertainty, the ratio-
nalizability problem has a structure similar to that of SEU in the sense that rationalizability
by a particular model involves finding a Bernoulli function u and a function φ belonging to
some family Φ that together rationalize the data, and this problem can in turn be transformed
(via Theorem 1) into a problem of solving a system of bilinear inequalities. In the Online
Appendix, we show how tests for various models, including choice acclimating personal equi-
librium (Ko¨szegi and Rabin, 2007), maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989),
and variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006), can be devised
using Theorem 1.
Even though solving a bilinear problem may be computationally intensive, the Tarski-
Seidenberg Theorem tells us that this problem is decidable, in the sense that there is a
known algorithm that can determine in a finite number of steps whether or not a solution
exists. Nonlinear tests are not new to the revealed preference literature; for example, they
appear in tests of weak separability (Varian, 1983a), in tests of maxmin expected utility and
other models of ambiguity (Bayer et al., 2013), and in tests of Walrasian general equilibrium
(Brown and Matzkin, 1996). Solving such problems can be computationally demanding,
but some cases can be computationally straightforward because of certain special features
and/or when the number of observations is small. In the case of the tests that we develop,
they simplify dramatically and are implementable in practice when there are only two states
(though they remain nonlinear). The two-state case, while special, is very common in applied
theoretical settings and laboratory experiments. For example, to implement the SEU test,
simply condition on the probability of state 1 (and hence on the probability of state 2), and
then perform a linear test to check whether there is a collection of real numbers tu¯prqurPX
solving (6), (7), and (8) (with φp¨, tq is defined by (3)). If not, choose another probability
for state 1, implement, and repeat (if necessary). Even a uniform grid search of up to two
decimal places on the probability of state 1 will lead to no more than 99 linear tests, which
can be implemented with little difficulty.18
18 While we have not found it necessary to use them in our implementation in this paper, there are solvers
available for mixed integer nonlinear programs (for example, as surveyed in Bussieck and Vigerske (2010))
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 Rank dependence and disappointment aversion. The rank dependent utility (RDU)
model (Quiggin, 1982) is a prominent model of choice under risk. In Section 4, we report
the findings of a test of this model, so we explain it here in greater detail. Let pis ą 0
be the objective probability of state s.19 Given a contingent consumption bundle x, we
can rank the entries of x from the smallest to the largest, with ties broken by the rank
of the state. We denote by rpx, sq, the rank of xs in x. For example, if there are five
states and x “ p1, 4, 4, 3, 5q, we have rpx, 1q “ 1, rpx, 2q “ 3, rpx, 3q “ 4, rpx, 4q “ 2, and
rpx, 5q “ 5. A rank dependent expected utility function gives to the bundle x the utility
V pxq “ řs¯s“1 δpx, squpxsq where u : R` Ñ R is a Bernoulli function,
δpx, sq “ g
´ř
ts1:rpx,s1qďrpx,squ pis1
¯
´ g
´ř
ts1:rpx,s1qărpx,squ pis1
¯
,
and g : r0, 1s Ñ R is a continuous and strictly increasing function. (If ts1 : rpx, s1q ă rpx, squ
is empty, we let g
´ř
ts1:rpx,s1qărpx,squ pis1
¯
“ gp0q.) The function g distorts the cumulative
distribution of the bundle x, so that an agent maximizing rank dependent utility can behave
as though the probability he attaches to a state depends on the relative attractiveness of
the outcome in that state. Since u is strictly increasing, δpx, sq “ δpupxq, sq and therefore
V pxq “ φpupxqq, where for any vector u “ pu1, u2, . . . , us¯q,
φpuq “
s¯ÿ
s“1
δpu, squs.
Note that the function φ is continuous and strictly increasing in u. So V has the form
assumed in Theorem 1, and we can use that result to devise a test for RDU-rationalizability.
We discuss a multiple-state version of the RDU test in the Appendix; at this point it
suffices to explain the two-state case, which is the one relevant to the implementation in
Section 4. Let ρs “ gppisq be the distorted value of pis (the true probability of state s, for
s “ 1, 2). Then φpu1, u2q “ ρ1u1 ` p1 ´ ρ1qu2 if u1 ď u2 and φpu1, u2q “ p1 ´ ρ2qu1 ` ρ2u2
if u1 ą u2; by Theorem 1, a sufficient (and obviously necessary) condition for a data set
O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 to be RDU-rationalizable is for there to be a solution to (6) and (7),
with this formula for φ. This test involves solving a set of inequalities that are bilinear in
that are potentially useful for implementing bilinear tests more generally.
19 To keep the notation light, we confine ourselves to the case where pi does not vary across observations.
There is no conceptual difficulty in allowing for this.
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 the unknowns tu¯prqurPX and tρ1, ρ2u. In our implementation, we simply let ρ1 and ρ2 take
different values on a very fine grid in r0, 1s2, subject to ρ1 ď ρ2 (if and only if pi1 ď pi2) and
(for each case) perform the corresponding linear test.
It is worth emphasizing at this point that for certain values of ρ1 and ρ2, the function
φ is clearly not concave or even quasiconcave, and therefore we cannot guarantee the qua-
siconcavity of the agent’s utility over contingent consumption, even if we restrict ourselves
to concave Bernoulli functions. While the lattice method still works in these cases, it is
not possible to formulate a test for rationalizability that allows for non-quasiconcave utility
functions using concave optimization methods (such as those cited in Section 1.3) because
the first order conditions are no longer sufficient for optimality.
We also implement a lattice test of Gul’s (1991) model of disappointment aversion (DA).
When there are two states, the DA model is a special case of the RDU model with a further
restriction on ρ1 and ρ2. Specifically, there is some β P p´1,8q such that, for s “ 1, 2,
ρs “ p1` βqpis
1` pisβ . (11)
Note that this restriction has bite only if ρ1 ‰ ρ2, so in fact the RDU and DA models
are identical when pi1 “ pi2. If β “ 0, the agent simply maximizes expected utility. If
β ą 0, we have ρs ą pis, so the agent attaches a probability on s that is higher than the
objective probability when s is the less favorable state; in this case, the agent is said to be
disappointment averse. If β ă 0, then ρs ă pis, and the agent is said to be elation seeking;
this is an instance where the function φ is not quasiconcave. As in the RDU model, we test
the DA model by letting β take on different values and performing the associated linear test.
While it is well known that the RDU and EU models lead to different predictions, it
not immediately clear that they are observationally distinct in the context of observations
drawn from linear budgets. We end this section with an example of a data set that is
RDU-rationalizable but not EU-rationalizable.
Example 3. Suppose the data set consists of three observations pxt,ptq, for t “ 1, 2, 3,
where p1 “ p1, qq, x1 “ pa, aq; p2 “ p1, 1{qq, x2 “ pb, bq; and p3 “ p1, p1{q2q ` q, x3 “
pa ` pa ´ bq{q, b ` pb ´ aqqq, with q ą 1 and a ă b, and  ą 0 is a small number. The three
observations are depicted Figure 3, where c “ a` pa´ bq{q and d “ b` pb´ aqq.
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 Figure 3: RDU-rationalizable but not EU-rationalizable data set
We claim that these observations are not EU-rationalizable if the two states are equiprob-
able. Suppose that they are, for some Bernoulli function u. Then the first observation tells
us that 2upaq ě upbq`upcq, since pb, cq is available when pa, aq is chosen. Similarly, from the
second observation, we know that 2upbq ě upaq ` updq. Together this gives
upbq ´ updq ě upaq ´ upbq ě upcq ´ upaq,
from which we obtain upaq ` upbq ě upcq ` updq. On the other hand, it is straightforward to
check that, with  ą 0, the bundle pa, bq is strictly cheaper than pc, dq at p3, which leads to
a contradiction since pc, dq is chosen over pa, bq at the third observation.20
We claim that these observations are RDU-rationalizable; in fact, they can be rationalized
with a smooth and concave Bernoulli function. Suppose V px1, x2q “ ρupx1q ` p1 ´ ρqupx2q
when x1 ď x2 and V px1, x2q “ p1´ρqupx1q`ρupx2q when x1 ą x2, with ρ “ q{pq`1q. Since
ρ ą 1{2, the agent displays disappointment aversion. So long as u is strictly concave, the
agent’s utility is maximized at x1 “ x2 whenever p1 “ 1 and p2 P r1{q, qs. So V rationalizes
the first two observations. To justify the third, it suffices to find u such that u1 ą 0 and
20 Equivalently, note that there is a violation of Fishburn’s condition. The bundle/lottery pa, aq is preferred
to pb, cq, pb, bq is preferred to pa, dq, and pc, dq is strictly preferred to pa, bq. However, the compound lottery
where pa, aq, pb, bq and pc, dq each occur with probability 1/3 is stochastically equivalent to the compound
lottery where pb, cq, pa, dq and pa, bq each occur with probability 1/3.
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 u2 ă 0 satisfying the first order condition
ρu1pcq
p1´ ρqu1pdq “ q
u1pcq
u1pdq “
p31
p32
“ q
2
1` q2.
If  is sufficiently small, this is possible since the price ratio p31{p32 is greater than q.21 l
3. Goodness of fit
The revealed preference tests presented in the previous section are ‘sharp’, in the sense
that a data set either passes the test for a given model or it fails. This either/or feature of
the tests is not particular to our results but is true of all classical revealed preference tests,
including Afriat’s. It would, of course, be desirable to develop a way of measuring the extent
to which a certain class of utility functions succeeds or fails in rationalizing a data set, and
the most common approach adopted in the revealed preference literature to address this
issue was developed by Afriat (1972, 1973) and Varian (1990).22, 23 We now give an account
of this approach and explain why implementing it in our setting is possible (or at least no
more difficult than implementing the exact tests).
Suppose that the observer collects a data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1; following the earlier
literature, we focus attention on the case where Bt is a classical linear budget set given by
(1). For any number et P r0, 1s, we define
Btpetq “ tx P Rs¯` : pt ¨ x ď etpt ¨ xtu Y txtu. (12)
Clearly Btpetq is smaller than Bt and shrinks with the value of et. Let U be a collection of
utility functions defined on Rs¯` belonging to a given family; for example, U could be the family
of locally nonsatiated utility functions (which was the family considered by Afriat (1972,
1973) and Varian (1990) in their work). We define the set EpUq in the following manner: a
vector e “ pe1, e2, . . . , eT q is in EpUq if there is some function U P U that rationalizes the
21 If it were smaller than q, this would not be possible since the concavity of u requires u1pcq ě u1pdq.
22 For examples where Afriat-Varian type indices are used to measure a model’s fit, see Mattei (2000),
Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001), Andreoni and Miller (2002), Choi et al. (2007, 2014), Beatty and
Crawford (2011), and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2016), and Pastor-Bernier, Plott, and Schultz (2017).
Echenique, Lee, and Shum (2011) develops and applies a related index called the money pump index.
23 For an account of why such measures may be more suitable then other measures of goodness-of-fit,
such as the sum of squared errors between observed and predicted demands, see Varian (1990) and Halevy,
Persitz, and Zrill (2016).
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 modified data set Opeq “ tpxt, BtpetqquTt“1, i.e., Upxtq ě Upxq for all x P Btpetq. Clearly, the
data set O is rationalizable by a utility function in U if and only if the unit vector p1, 1, . . . , 1q
is in EpUq. We also know that EpUq must be nonempty since it contains the vector 0, and it
is clear that if e P EpUq then e1 P EpUq, where e1 ă e. The closeness of the set EpUq to the
unit vector is a measure of how well the utility functions in U can explain the data. Afriat
(1972, 1973) suggests measuring this distance with the supnorm, so the distance between e
and 1 is DApeq “ 1´min1ďtďT tetu, while Varian (1990) suggests that we choose the square
of the Euclidean distance, i.e., DV peq “ řTt“1p1´ etq2.
Measuring distance by the supnorm has the advantage that it is computationally straight-
forward, and it is also the measure most commonly used in the empirical revealed preference
literature, so this is the approach that we adopt in our implementation (see Section 4). Note
that DApeq “ DApreq where re is the vector with identical entries equal to min te1, e2, . . . , eT u,
where e “ pe1, e2, . . . , eT q. Since re ď e, we obtain re P EpUq whenever e P EpUq. Therefore,
minePEpUqDApeq “ mineP rEpUqDApeq, where rEpUq “ te P EpUq : et “ et1 for any t, t1u, i.e.,
in searching for e P EpUq that minimizes the supnorm distance from p1, 1, . . . , 1q, we can
focus our attention on the set rEpUq, which consists of those vectors in EpUq that shrink
each observed budget set by the same proportion. Given a data set O “ tpxt,ptquTt“1, Afriat
refers to sup te : pe, e, . . . , eq P EpUqu as the critical cost efficiency index; we say that O is
rationalizable in U at the efficiency index/threshold e1 if pe1, e1, . . . , e1q P EpUq.
Suppose that for a given data set, the critical cost efficiency index is 0.95. In that case,
while we cannot guarantee that xt is optimal in the true budget set, we know that there is
some utility function in U for which xt is optimal in Btp0.95q at every observation t. With this
utility function, there could be bundles in Bt which the subject prefers to xt, but choosing
such a bundle (instead of xt) will not lead to savings of more than 5%. Furthermore, this
number is tight in the following sense: given any  ą 0, then for every utility function in U ,
there is at least one observation t where the subject could indeed have saved p5´ q% of her
expenditure.24 We can interpret this index as a characteristic of the subject and, specifically,
a measure of her bounded rationality; the bounded rationality could have arisen because she
is simply incapable of better decision making, or it could be that she has consciously or
24Formally, for every U P U there is t such that max tUpxq : pt ¨ x ď pt ¨ xtp0.95` 0.01qu ą Upxtq.
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 otherwise judged that it is not, from a broader perspective, rational for her to expend the
mental powers needed for exactly rational portfolio decisions.
Calculating the efficiency index (or, more generally, an index based on the Euclidean
metric) will require checking whether a particular vector e “ pe1, e2, . . . , eT q is in EpUq, i.e.,
whether Opeq “ tpxt, BtpetqquTt“1 is rationalizable by a member of U . When U is the family
of all locally nonsatiated utility functions, Afriat (1972, 1973) provides a necessary and
sufficient condition for the rationalizability of Opeq “ tpxt, BtpetqquTt“1 (which we describe in
greater detail in the Online Appendix).
More generally, the calculation of the efficiency index will hinge on whether there is a
suitable test for the rationalizability of Opeq “ tpxt, BtpetqquTt“1 by members of U . Even if a
test of the rationalizability of O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 by members of U is available, this test may
rely on the convexity or linearity of the budget sets Bt; in this case, extending the test so
as to check for the rationalizability of Opeq “ tpxt, BtpetqquTt“1 is not straightforward since
the modified budget sets Btpetq are clearly nonconvex. Crucially, this is not the case with
the lattice method, which is applicable even for nonconvex constraint sets, so long as they
are compact. Thus extending our testing procedure to measure goodness of fit in the form
of the efficiency index involves no additional difficulties.
3.1 Approximate smooth rationalizability
While Theorem 1 guarantees that there is a Bernoulli function u that extends u¯ : X Ñ R`
and rationalizes the data when the required conditions are satisfied, the Bernoulli function
is not necessarily smooth (though it is continuous and strictly increasing by definition). Of
course, the smoothness of u is commonly assumed in applications of expected utility and
related models and its implications can appear to be stark. For example, suppose that it is
commonly known that states 1 and 2 occur with equal probability and we observe the agent
choosing p1, 1q at a price vector pp1, p2q, with p1 ‰ p2. This observation is incompatible
with a smooth EU model; indeed, given that the two states are equiprobable, the slope
of the indifference curve at p1, 1q must equal ´1 and thus it will not be tangential to the
budget line and will not be a local optimum. On the other hand, it is trivial to check that
this observation is EU-rationalizable in our sense. In fact, one could even find a concave
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 Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R` for which p1, 1q maximizes expected utility. (Such a u will,
of course, have a kink at 1.)
These two facts can be reconciled by noticing that, even though this observation cannot
be exactly rationalized by a smooth Bernoulli function, it is in fact possible to find a smooth
function that comes arbitrarily close to rationalizing it. Indeed, given any strictly increasing
and continuous function u defined on a compact interval of R`, there is a strictly increasing
and smooth function u˜ that is uniformly and arbitrarily close to u on that interval. As such,
if a Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R` rationalizes O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 by tφp¨, tquTt“1, then for
any efficiency threshold e P p0, 1q, there is a smooth Bernoulli function u˜ : R` Ñ R` that
rationalizes O1 “ tpxt, BtpeqquTt“1 by tφp¨, tquTt“1. In other words, if a data set is rationalizable
by some Bernoulli function, then it can also be rationalized by a smooth Bernoulli function,
for any efficiency threshold arbitrarily close to 1. In this sense, imposing a smoothness
requirement on the Bernoulli function does not radically alter a model’s ability to explain a
given data set.
4. Implementation
We examine the data collected from the well known portfolio choice experiment in Choi,
Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007). The experiment was performed on 93 undergraduate sub-
jects at the University of California, Berkeley. Every subject was asked to make consumption
choices on 50 decision problems under risk. The subject divided her budget between two
Arrow-Debreu securities, with each security paying one token if the corresponding state was
realized, and zero otherwise. In a symmetric treatment applied to 47 subjects, each state of
the world occurred with probability 1{2, and in a (balanced) asymmetric treatment applied
to 46 subjects, the probabilities of the states were 1{3 and 2{3. These probabilities were
objectively known. Lastly, income was normalized to one, and the state prices were chosen
at random and varied across subjects.
In their analysis, Choi et al. (2007) first tested whether each subject could have been
maximizing a locally nonsatiated utility function by performing a GARP test (or, strictly
speaking, an extended version of the GARP test that characterizes rationalizability at a given
efficiency threshold). Those subjects who passed GARP at a sufficiently high efficiency
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 threshold were then fitted individually to a two-parameter version of the disappointment
aversion model of Gul (1991). The lattice method developed in this paper makes it possible
for us to re-analyze the same data using purely revealed preference techniques, without
appealing to any parametric assumptions. In this section we evaluate different models of
decision making with these newly developed tests according to three criteria: (1) the ability
of the model to explain the observed data; (2) the precision of the model’s predictions (in
various senses that we shall define); and (3) an index combining (1) and (2).
We consider five nested models in our empirical analysis. The most stringent of these is
the expected utility (EU) model, followed by the disappointment aversion (DA) and rank
dependent utility (RDU) models. (Recall from Section 2, however, that the RDU and DA
models are identical when the two states are equiprobable.) We test these three models
using the lattice method developed in Sections 2 and 3. In addition we test for basic ratio-
nalizability, i.e., consistency with locally nonsatiated utility maximization. A more stringent
criterion is rationalizability by a stochastically monotone utility (SMU) function; this is a
utility function that gives strictly higher utility to the bundle x compared to y whenever x
first order stochatically dominates y (with respect to the objective probabilities attached to
each state) and gives them the same utility whenever they are stochastically equivalent.
A test of consistency with a stochastically monotone utility function (at a given efficiency
threshold) was recently developed by Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017); this test has features
similar to GARP and we shall refer to it as F-GARP (see the Online Appendix for details). In
the Choi et al. (2007) experiment, there are just two states. In this case it is straightforward
to check that when pi1 “ pi2 “ 1{2, a utility function is stochastically monotone if and
only if it is strictly increasing and symmetric, and when pi2 ą pi1, a utility function U is
stochastically monotone if and only if it is strictly increasing and Upa, bq ą Upb, aq whenever
b ą a. Notice that the RDU, DA, and EU models all obey this property; in fact, it is well
known that these three models respect first order stochastic dominance, even when there are
more than two states of the world.
4.1 Exact pass rates and efficiency indices
We first test all five models on the Choi et al. (2007) data, and the results from these
exact tests are displayed in Table 1, where each cell contains a pass rate. Across 50 decision
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 pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2 Total
GARP 12/47 (26%) GARP 4/46 (9%) GARP 16/93 (17%)
F-GARP 1/47 (2%) F-GARP 3/46 (7%) F-GARP 4/93 (4%)
RDU/DA 1/47 (2%)
RDU 2/46 (4%) RDU 3/93 (3%)
DA 1/46 (2%) DA 2/93 (2%)
EU 1/47 (2%) EU 1/46 (2%) EU 2/93 (2%)
Table 1: Pass rates
Figure 4: Distribution of efficiency indices for utility maximization
problems, 16 out of 93 subjects obey GARP and are therefore consistent with basic utility
maximization; subjects in the symmetric treatment perform distinctly better than those in
the asymmetric treatment. Of the 16 subjects who pass GARP, only 4 pass F-GARP; still
fewer subjects are rationalizable by the RDU, DA, and EU models.
Given that we observe 50 decisions for every subject, it may not be intuitively surprising
that so many subjects should have violated GARP (let alone more stringent conditions). We
next investigate the efficiency thresholds at which subjects pass the different tests. First, we
calculate the efficiency index at which each of the 93 subjects passes GARP; this empirical
distribution is depicted in Figure 4. (Note that this figure is essentially a replication of
Figure 4 in Choi et al. (2007).) We see that more than 80% of subjects have an efficiency
index above 0.9, and more than 90% have an index above 0.8. A first glance at these results
suggest that the data are largely compatible with the locally nonsatiated utility model.
To better understand what the observed distribution of efficiency indices says about the
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 (a) pi1 “ 1{2 (b) pi ‰ 1{2
Figure 5: Distributions of efficiency indices
success or failure of a particular model to explain the data collected, it is useful to see what
distribution of efficiency indices will arise if we postulate an alternative form of behavior.
We adopt an approach first suggested by Bronars (1987) that simulates random uniform
consumption, i.e., which posits that consumers are choosing randomly uniformly from their
budget frontiers. The Bronars (1987) approach has become common practice in the revealed
preference literature as a way of assessing the power or precision of revealed preference tests.
We follow exactly the procedure of Choi et al. (2007) and generate a random sample of
25,000 simulated subjects. Each simulated subject chooses randomly uniformly from 50
budget lines that are selected in the same random fashion as in the experimental setting.
The dotted curve in Figure 4 corresponds to the distribution of efficiency indices for the
simulated subjects. The experimental and simulated distributions are starkly different. For
example, while 80% of subjects have an efficiency index of 0.9 or higher, the chance of a
randomly generated data set passing GARP at an efficiency index of 0.9 is negligible. In
other words, even though the locally nonsatiated utility model could accommodate much of
the choice behavior observed in the experiment, it is also precise enough to exclude behavior
that is simply randomly generated, which lends support to basic utility maximization as an
accurate and discriminating model of choice among contingent consumption bundles.
Going beyond Choi et al. (2007), we then calculate the distributions of efficiency in-
dices associated with the SMU, RDU, DA, and EU models among the 93 subjects. These
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 distributions are shown in Figures 5a and 5b, which correspond to the symmetric and asym-
metric treatments, respectively. Since all of these models are more stringent than basic
utility maximization, one would expect their efficiency indices to be lower, and they are.
Nonetheless, at an efficiency threshold of 0.9, around half of all subjects are consistent with
the EU model, with the proportion distinctly higher under the symmetric treatment. In the
symmetric case, the performance of the EU, RDU/DA,25 and SMU models are very close; in
fact, their efficiency index distributions are almost indistinguishable. In the asymmetric case,
the distinctions between models are sharper. The RDU and SMU models appear to perform
considerably better than the EU and DA models, with their distributions of efficiency indices
close to the distribution for the locally nonsatiated utility model. We have not depicted any
efficiency index distributions for the SMU, RDU, DA, or EU models using randomly gen-
erated data, but plainly these will be even lower than for basic utility maximization and
therefore very different from the distributions for the experimental subjects.
4.2 Pass rates
In order to compare the pass rates for different models more closely, we now concentrate
on their performance at the 0.9 and 0.95 efficiency thresholds. These efficiency levels seem
like reasonable standards that one might set in order to consider whether a model is consistent
with the data; exact rationalizability is too stringent and anything less than 0.9 may be too
permissive. The pass rates at these thresholds are presented in Table 2, where the models are
arranged according to their generality, with the most permissive at the top. Assuming that
the experimental subjects are a random sample drawn from a larger population of decision
makers, we can use the sample pass rate for a model to estimate its expected population
pass rate; these confidence intervals can be calculated exactly using the Clopper-Pearson
procedure and are displayed in the Online Appendix.
We see from Table 2 that, at the 0.9 threshold, around 80% of all subjects pass GARP.
Among this group, about half in turn display behavior that is consistent with the EU model
(and, in fact, significantly more than half under the symmetric treatment). There is some
evidence that the RDU model explains a significant number of subjects not captured by
the EU model. In particular, in the asymmetric case, almost 90% of subjects who pass
25 Recall that in the symmetric case, the RDU and DA models are identical.
26
                            27 / 53
 pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95 e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95
GARP 38/47 (81%) 32/47 (68%) GARP 37/46 (80%) 29/46 (63%)
F-GARP 30/47 (64%) 23/47 (49%) F-GARP 33/46 (72%) 26/46 (57%)
RDU/DA 30/47 (64%) 23/47 (49%)
RDU 33/46 (72%) 24/46 (52%)
DA 20/46 (43%) 12/46 (26%)
EU 30/47 (64%) 18/47 (38%) EU 18/46 (39%) 12/46 (26%)
Table 2: Pass rates by efficiency level
GARP at the 0.9 threshold are also consistent with the RDU model, which appears to be a
significantly better performance than for the EU model. Indeed, there is very little room for
the RDU model to perform better, since it manages to accommodate almost every subject
who passes F-GARP at the same threshold. On the other hand, the DA model, which lies
strictly between the RDU and EU models under the asymmetric treatment, does not perform
significantly better than the EU model.26
We should be more precise on what we mean by a model performing ‘significantly better’
than another. We do not simply mean that the difference between the true (population)
pass rates is distinct from zero; such a statistical claim is not meaningful when two models
are nested.27 We adopt a more stringent notion of ‘significant’ difference: we test the null
hypothesis that the difference in expected pass rates between model A and model B is equal
to 5%, against an alternative hypothesis that this difference is greater than 5%; since model B
is nested within A, we are checking whether the additional data sets which are accommodated
by model A but not B significantly exceeds 5%. The findings of these tests are reported in
Table 3. For example, at the 0.95 threshold under the symmetric treatment, Table 2 tells us
that the sample proportion of subjects who pass the test for RDU/DA but fail the test for
EU is 5/47; this gives a p-value of 0.085, which is not statistically significant, i.e., we fail to
reject the null hypothesis of a 5% difference at the 0.05 significance level.
The performance of the RDU model under the asymmetric treatment is quite different.
26 While the contexts and methods are very different, the relatively poor performance of the DA model
has been noted in some other studies, for example, Hey and Orme (1994) and Barseghyan et al. (2013).
27 Suppose model A contains model B. Denoting the expected pass rates of model A (B) by µA (µB), the
null hypothesis that µA “ µB is rejected if there is one data set which passes A but not B. Indeed, given
that B is a special case of A, we are effectively testing the proportion of data sets which pass A and fail B;
we conclude that the proportion of data sets of this type is nonzero as long as one such data set is observed.
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 pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e
“
0
.9
5
GARP F-GARP RDU/DA
e
“
0.
95
GARP F-GARP RDU DA
F-GARP 0.000 ¨ ¨ F-GARP 0.406 ¨ ¨ ¨
RDU/DA 0.000 1.000 ¨ RDU 0.079 0.677 ¨ ¨
DA 0.000 0.000 0.000 ¨
EU 0.000 0.085 0.085 EU 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
e
“
0
.9
0
GARP F-GARP RDU/DA
e
“
0.
90
GARP F-GARP RDU DA
F-GARP 0.002 ¨ ¨ F-GARP 0.197 ¨ ¨ ¨
RDU/DA 0.002 1.000 ¨ RDU 0.197 1.000 ¨ ¨
DA 0.000 0.000 0.000 ¨
EU 0.002 1.000 1.000 EU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.677
Note: Each cell contains a p-value.
Table 3: Pairwise 5%-differences in pass rates
First, while the stochastically monotone utility model is theoretically more general, its pass
rate is not significantly higher than 5% of that for the RDU model (at both efficiency
thresholds). On the other hand, the pass rate for the RDU model compared to the EU
model does significantly exceed 5%. Another way of saying the same thing is that if we are
to form a 90% confidence interval on the expected proportion of subjects who are RDU-
rationalizable but not EU-rationalizable, the lower bound of that interval exceeds 5%. What
is that lower bound? At the 0.9 and 0.95 efficiency thresholds it is, respectively, 21% and
16%, which is sizeable by any reckoning. The RDU model generalizes the EU model by
permitting a distortion of the objective probabilities; the Online Appendix contains more
information on the type of distortions which are consistent with the data.
There is a large empirical literature that evaluates the performance of different models of
choice under risk using experimental or field data and our results appear to be broadly in line
with the findings obtained in earlier studies, even though the very different empirical methods
employed make formal comparisons difficult. In particular, other papers have also found that
the RDU model performs well (see, for example, Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010) and
Barseghyan et al. (2013) and their references). We find that the EU model captures a
significant portion of subjects, though by no means everyone, which is broadly consistent
with the fairly common finding that the EU model puts in a respectable performance (see,
for example, Hey and Orme (1994)). The pass rate that we report for the EU model is higher
than that in some other papers (for example, Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010) reports
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 a pass rate of 20% for the EU model), but it is worth bearing in mind that our formulation
of the EU model is about as permissive as it could get. We require the Bernoulli function
to be increasing in money, but it is estimated nonparametrically and with no curvature
assumptions (such as concavity), so we have given the EU model the greatest possible scope
to capture a subject’s behavior.
4.3 Power
To examine more closely the power of different models, we adopt and then adapt the
approach first suggested by Bronars (1987). We first generate data sets where on each budget
set, the bundle is randomly chosen based on a uniform distribution on the budget frontier.
The power of the model (or its Bronars power) is then given by the probability of such a data
set being inconsistent with (say) utility maximization, which is synonymous with it failing
GARP. As we have already pointed out in Section 4.1, when the data set consists of uniform
bundles on 50 randomly chosen budget sets, the Bronars power is approximately 1 at both
the 0.9 and 0.95 efficiency thresholds; in other words, the probability of such a randomly
generated data set passing GARP at either threshold is vanishingly small. Obviously, the
Bronars power of the other models we consider is also roughly equal to 1, since all of them
imply locally nonsatiated preferences.
When we consider a model that is theoretically more stringent than basic utility max-
imization, it is natural to investigate the power of the model in the context of observed
behavior that is already consistent with GARP. In other words, we would like to know the
sharpness of the model’s predictions relative to basic utility maximization. For example, to
check the relative power of the EU model in this sense, we randomly generate a large number
of data sets that pass GARP at a given efficiency threshold, and then test if they obey EU
at the same threshold. (See the Online Appendix for details.) Since the EU, DA, and RDU
models are consistent with stochastic monotonicity, it is also natural to investigate the power
of these models, relative to the SMU model; this would give us a sense of how stringent are
the restrictions imposed by (say) the EU model, over and above those imposed by F-GARP.
Table 4 presents the power of the different models, conditional on passing GARP. The
most obvious and important feature in this table is the ubiquity of numbers close to 1: even
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 pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95 e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95
F-GARP 1.00 1.00 F-GARP 0.88 0.92
RDU/DA 1.00 1.00
RDU 1.00 1.00
DA 1.00 1.00
EU 1.00 1.00 EU 1.00 1.00
Table 4: Power (conditional on GARP)
pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95 e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95
RDU/DA 0.75 0.99
RDU 0.99 1.00
DA 1.00 1.00
EU 0.87 0.99 EU 1.00 1.00
Table 5: Power (conditional on F-GARP)
after conditioning on passing GARP, all of the models remain very precise. For example,
the probability of a data set which obeys GARP also passing the EU test at the 0.9 or
0.95 threshold is effectively zero. The only partial exception is for the SMU model in the
asymmetric case, where the power is around 90%.
Table 5 tells us that all the models remain very precise relative to the SMU model when
the treatment is asymmetric. But in the symmetric case, the relative power of the RDU/DA
and EU models is noticeably lower than 1; for example, a quarter of all subjects who pass F-
GARP at the 0.9 threshold are also consistent with the RDU/DA model. A possible reason
for the loss of relative power in the symmetric case is that stochastic monotonicity itself
is very restrictive in this context since it is synonymous with an increasing and symmetric
utility function. However, we should emphasize that the relative power of the RDU, DA,
and EU models remains high.
4.4 Predictive success
The index of predictive success proposed by Selten (1991) (or the Selten index, for short)
combines pass rates and power into a single measure. This index is defined as the difference
between the pass rate and the size of the set of predicted outcomes (the imprecision), with
the latter typically measured by a uniform measure on all outcomes. Selten provides an
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 axiomatic foundation for this index. The index varies between 1 and ´1. It is close to 1
when the pass rate is close to 1 and the imprecision is close to zero; in other words, even
though the model is very precise in its predictions (i.e., has a high power), the data collected
are very often consistent with the model. On the other hand, an index close to ´1 occurs
when the pass rate is close to zero even though the model is very imprecise (i.e., has a low
power). An index above zero indicates that the model has some predictive success. Our use
of the Selten index to evaluate different models is not novel. In the context of consumer
demand (which formally is very similar to ours), it has been used by Beatty and Crawford
(2011); it has also been used by Harless and Camerer (1994) to compare the performance of
different models of choice under risk.
As we have emphasized, with 50 observations on every subject, the locally nonsatiated
utility model has a power that is almost indistinguishable from 1 at the 0.9 and 0.95 efficiency
thresholds. The same is true of course of all the other models, since they are more restrictive
than basic utility maximization. In other words, all the models have an imprecision of zero,
so that the Selten indices for the different models are effectively given by their pass rates,
as displayed in Table 2. Note also that because the different models are nested within one
another, any observed differences (from zero) in the pass rates/Selten indices in Table 2 are
all statistically significant. One conclusion to be drawn from this table is that the best model,
as evaluated by the Selten index, is the locally nonsatiated utility model. This observation
may be simple but it is not without interest: while a great deal of academic discussion is
often focussed on comparing different models that have been tailor-made for decision making
under risk, we should not take it for granted that such models are necessarily better than
basic utility maximization in explaining choice behavior. In environments where state payoffs
vary while state probabilities are fixed, one should not exclude the possibility that the locally
nonsatiated utility model does a better job in explaining the data, even after accounting for
its relative lack of specificity.28
28 This observation is not an argument against the value of models of choice under risk, such as the SMU,
RDU, and all other models considered here. In particular, these other models provide a theory of choice
across all lotteries, allowing even for comparisons between lotteries where the same outcomes occur with
different probabilities. In environments where agents are making choices among lotteries of this type, all the
other models are still potentially applicable, but it is not clear how one could naturally generalize the locally
nonsatiated utility model to accommodate such a context.
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 pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95 e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95
F-GARP 0.79 0.72 F-GARP 0.77 0.81
RDU/DA 0.79 0.72
RDU 0.89 0.83
DA 0.54 0.41
EU 0.79 0.56 EU 0.49 0.41
Table 6: Predictive success (conditional on GARP)
Our next objective is to investigate conditional predictive success. We first turn to the
case where we condition on basic rationalizability. The conditional pass rate of each model
can be calculated from Table 2. A model’s imprecision is simply 1 minus the Bronars power
(conditional on GARP) and this is supplied in Table 4. The Selten indices, constructed by
taking the difference between the conditional pass rate and the conditional imprecision, are
displayed in Table 6. For the symmetric treatment, all of the models have a conditional power
of approximately 1 (see Table 4), so the Selten indices are nearly completely determined by
the conditional pass rates and, as such, the differences between the SMU, RDU/DA, and EU
models are not large. For the asymmetric treatment, the best performing model is RDU;
this is driven by two factors: its pass rate is higher than all models except SMU and its
power is higher than SMU. In the Online Appendix, we show that this difference between
RDU model and the more restrictive DA and EU models are statistically significant.
Lastly, we investigate the predictive success of the EU, DA, and RDU models when
we condition on passing F-GARP. The Selten indices displayed in Table 7 are obtained by
taking the difference between the conditional pass rates (constructed from Table 2) and con-
ditional power (from Table 5). Focussing firstly on the symmetric treatment, an interesting
phenomenon is that, according to the Selten index, the EU model is now better than the
RDU/DA model at the 0.9 efficiency threshold; this is entirely driven by the greater power
of the EU model in this context. That said, the difference between the indices is not large
and it is also reversed at the 0.95 threshold. For the asymmetric treatment, we notice that
the RDU model performs well relative to the other models, because its pass rate is high
and because the model continues to have high power, even after conditioning on passing
F-GARP; we show in the Online Appendix that this difference is statistically significant.
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 pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95 e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95
RDU/DA 0.75 0.99
RDU 0.99 0.92
DA 0.61 0.46
EU 0.87 0.78 EU 0.55 0.46
Table 7: Predictive success (conditional on F-GARP)
Appendix
The proof of Theorem 1 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let tCtuTt“1 be a finite collection of constraint sets in Rs¯` that are compact and
downward closed (i.e., if x P Ct then so is y P Rs¯` such that y ă x) and let the functions
tφp¨, tquTt“1 be continuous and increasing in all dimensions. Suppose that there is a finite set
X of R`, a strictly increasing function u¯ : X Ñ R`, and tM tuTt“1 such that the following
holds:
M t ě φpu¯pxq, tq for all x P Ct X L and (13)
M t ą φpu¯pxq, tq for all x P pCtzBCtq X L, (14)
where L “ X s¯ and u¯pxq “ pu¯px1q, u¯px2q, . . . , u¯pxs¯qq. Then there is a Bernoulli function
u : R` Ñ R` that extends u¯ such that
M t ě φpupxq, tq for all x P Ct and (15)
if x P Ct and M t “ φpupxq, tq, then x P BCt X L and M t “ φpu¯pxq, tq. (16)
Remark: The property (16) needs some explanation. Conditions (13) and (14) allow for
the possibility that M t “ φpu¯px1q, tq for some x1 P BCt X L; we denote the set of points in
BCt X L with this property by X 1. Clearly any extension u will preserve this property, i.e.,
M t “ φpupx1q, tq for all x1 P X 1. Property (16) says that we can choose u such that for all
x P CtzX 1, we have M t ą φpupxq, tq.
Proof: We shall prove this result by induction on the dimension of the space containing the
constraint sets. It is trivial to check that the claim is true if s¯ “ 1. In this case, L consists
of a finite set of points on R` and each Ct is a closed interval with 0 as its minimum. Now
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 let us suppose that the claim holds for s¯ “ m and we shall prove it for s¯ “ m ` 1. If, for
each t, there is a strictly increasing and continuous utility function ut : R` Ñ R` extending
u¯ such that (15) and (16) hold, then the the same conditions will hold for the increasing
and continuous function u “ mint ut. So we can focus our attention on constructing ut for a
single constraint set Ct.
Suppose X “ t0, r1, r2, r3, . . . , rIu, with r0 “ 0 ă ri ă ri`1, for i “ 1, 2, . . . , I ´ 1. Let
r¯ “ max tr P R` : pr, 0, 0, . . . , 0q P Ctu and suppose that pri, 0, 0, . . . , 0q P Ct if and only if
i ď N (for some N ď I). Consider the collection of sets of the form Di “ ty P Rm` : pri,yq P
Ctu (for i “ 1, 2, . . . , N); this is a finite collection of compact and downward closed sets in
Rm` . By the induction hypothesis applied to tDiuNi“1, with tφpu¯priq, ¨, tquNi“1 as the collection
of functions, there is a strictly increasing function u˚ : R` Ñ R` extending u¯ such that
M t ě φpu¯priq,u˚pyq, tq for all pri,yq P Ct and (17)
if pri,yq P Ct and M t “ φpu¯priq,u˚pyq, tq, then pri,yq P BCt X L and M t “ φpu¯pri,yq, tq.
(18)
For each r P r0, r¯s, define
Uprq “ tu ď u˚prq : maxtφpu,u˚pyq, tq : pr,yq P Ctu ďM tu.
This set is nonempty; indeed u¯prkq “ u˚prkq P Uprq, where rk is the largest element in
X that is weakly smaller than r. This is because, if pr,yq P Ct then so is prk,yq, and (17)
guarantees that φpu¯prkq,u˚pyq, tq ďM t. The downward closedness of Ct and the fact that u˚
is increasing also guarantees that Uprq Ď Upr1q whenever r ă r1. Now define u˜prq “ supUprq;
the function u˜ has a number of significant properties. (i) For r P X , u˜prq “ u˚prq “ u¯prq (by
the induction hypothesis). (ii) u˜ is a nondecreasing function since U is nondecreasing. (iii)
u˜prq ą u¯prkq if r ą rk, where rk is largest element in X smaller than r. Indeed, because Ct is
compact and φ continuous, φpu˜prq,u˚pyq, tq ďM t for all pr,yq P Ct. By way of contradiction,
suppose u˜prq “ u¯prkq and hence u˜prq ă u˚prq. It follows from the definition of u˜prq that, for
any sequence un, with u˜prq ă un ă u˚prq and limnÑ8 un “ u˜prq, there is pr,ynq P Ct such
that φpun,u˚pynq, tq ą M t. Since Ct is compact, we may assume with no loss of generality
that yn Ñ yˆ and pr, yˆq P Ct, from which we obtain φpu˜prq,u˚pyˆq, tq “ M t. Since Ct is
downward closed, prk, yˆq P Ct and, since u¯prkq “ u˚prkq, we have φpu˚prk, yˆq, tq “M t. This
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 can only occur if prk, yˆq P BCt X L (because of (18)), but it is clear that prk, yˆq R BCt since
prk, yˆq ă pr, yˆq. (iv) If rn ă ri for all n and rn Ñ ri P X , then u˜prnq Ñ u˚priq. Suppose to
the contrary, that the limit is uˆ ă u˚priq “ u¯priq. Since u˚ is continuous, we can assume,
without loss of generality, that u˜prnq ă u˚prnq. By the compactness of Ct, the continuity of
φ, and the definition of u˜, there is prn,ynq P Ct such that φpu˜prnq,u˚pynq, tq “ M t. This
leads to φpuˆ,u˚py1q, tq “M t, where y1 is an accumulation point of yn and pri,y1q P Ct. But
since φ is strictly increasing, we obtain φpu˚priq,u˚py1q, tq ąM t, which contradicts (17).
Given the properties of u˜, we can find a continuous and strictly increasing function ut
such that ut extends u¯, i.e., utprq “ u¯prq for r P X , utprq ă u˚prq for all r P R`zX and
utprq ă u˜prq ď u˚prq for all r P r0, r¯szX . (In fact we can choose ut to be smooth everywhere
except possibly on X .) We claim that (15) and (16) are satisfied for Ct. To see this, note
that for r P X and pr,yq P Ct, the induction hypothesis guarantees that (17) and (18) hold
and they will continue to hold if u˚ is replaced by ut. In the case where r R X and pr,yq P Ct,
since utprq ă u˜prq and φ is increasing, we obtain M t ą φputpr,yq, tq. QED
Proof of Theorem 1: This follows immediately from Lemma 1 if we set Ct “ Bt, and
M t “ φpu¯pxtq, tq. If u¯ obeys conditions (6) and (7) then it obeys conditions (13) and (14).
The rationalizability of O by tφp¨, tqutPT then follows from (15). QED
Description of the RDU-rationalizability test for multiple states: Suppose that
pis ą 0 is the objective probability of state s. To develop a necessary and sufficient test
for RDU-rationalizability, we first define Γ “ třsPS pis : S Ď t1, 2, . . . , s¯uu, i.e., Γ is a finite
subset of r0, 1s that includes both 0 and 1 (corresponding to S equal to the empty set and
the whole set, respectively). Suppose there are strictly increasing functions g¯ : Γ Ñ R and
u¯ : X Ñ R` such that (6) and (7) are satisfied, with φpuq “ řs¯s“1 δpu, squs and
δpu, sq “ g¯
´ř
ts1:rpu,s1qďrpu,squ pis1
¯
´ g¯
´ř
ts1:rpu,s1qărpu,squ pis1
¯
.
By Theorem 1, this guarantees that O is RDU-rationalizable, with g : r0, 1s Ñ R chosen
to be any strictly increasing extension of g¯. This test involves finding a solution to a set
of inequalities that are bilinear in the unknowns tg¯pγquγPΓ and tu¯prqurPX . It is also clear
that these conditions are necessary for RDU-rationalizability since they will be satisfied if
we simply let g¯ and u¯ be the restrictions of g and u to Γ and X respectively. QED
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 Online Appendix
to
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty
Matthew Polisson, John K.-H. Quah, and Ludovic Renou
A1. Introduction
This Online Appendix consists of six parts. In Section A2, we discuss further applications of
the lattice method which are not covered in the Main Text. In particular, we cover the choice
acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) model (Ko¨szegi and Rabin, 2007), the maxmin ex-
pected utility (MEU) model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), the variational preference (VP)
model (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006), and a model with budget-dependent
reference points. The other sections provide additional information on the empirical imple-
mentation in the main paper.
A3. Description of GARP and F-GARP Tests
A4. Confidence intervals on pass rates
A5. Bronars power calculation
A6. Probability distortions in the RDU model
A7. Statistical analysis of Selten index differences
A2. Further applications of the lattice method
Theorem 1 in the Main Text can also be used to test the rationalizability of many other
models of choice under risk and under uncertainty. Formally, this involves finding a Bernoulli
function u and a function φ belonging to some family Φ (corresponding to the particular
model at hand) which together rationalize the data. In the subjective expected utility
(SEU) case that was discussed in the Main Text, the lattice test involves solving a system of
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 inequalities that are bilinear in the utility levels tu¯prqurPX and the subjective probabilities
tpisus¯s“1. Such a formulation seems natural enough in the SEU case; what is worth remarking
(and perhaps not obvious a priori) is that the same pattern holds across many of the common
models of choice under risk and under uncertainty: they can be tested by solving a system of
inequalities that are bilinear in tu¯prqurPX and a finite set of variables specific to the particular
model in question. It is known that bilinear systems are decidable, in the sense that there is
an algorithm that can determine in a finite number of steps whether or not a solution exists.
In the Main Text, we have already explained how the expected utility (EU), disappointment
aversion (DA), and rank dependent utility (RDU) models can be tested using the lattice
method. In this section we further illustrate the flexibility of the lattice method by applying
it to several prominent models of decision making under risk or uncertainty.
A2.1 Choice acclimating personal equilibrium
The choice acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) model (Ko¨szegi and Rabin, 2007)
(with a piecewise linear gain-loss function) specifies utility as V pxq “ φpupxq,piq, where
φppu1, u2, . . . , us¯q,piq “
s¯ÿ
s“1
pisus ` 1
2
p1´ λq
s¯ÿ
r,s“1
pirpis|ur ´ us|, (A.1)
pi “ tpisus¯s“1 are the objective probabilities, and λ P r0, 2s is the coefficient of loss aversion.1
We say that a data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is CPE-rationalizable with the probability weights
pi “ ppi1, pi2, . . . , pis¯q " 0 if there is φ in the collection ΦCPE of functions of the form (A.1),
and a Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R` such that, for each t, φpupxtq,pitq ě φpupxq,pitq for
all x P Bt. Applying Theorem 1 in the Main Text, O is CPE-rationalizable if and only if
there is λ P r0, 2s and a strictly increasing function u¯ : X Ñ R` that solve (6) and (7) in
the Main Text. It is notable that, irrespective of the number of states, this test is linear
in the remaining variables for any given value of λ. Thus it is relatively straightforward to
implement via a collection of linear tests (running over different values of λ P r0, 2s).
A2.2 Maxmin expected utility
1 Our presentation of CPE follows Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016). The restriction of λ to r0, 2s guar-
antees that V respects first order stochastic dominance but allows for loss-loving behavior (see Masatlioglu
and Raymond (2016)).
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 We again consider a setting where no objective probabilities can be attached to each state.
An agent with maxmin expected utility (MEU), first presented by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), evaluates each bundle x P Rs¯` using the formula V pxq “ φpupxqq, where
φpuq “ min
piPΠ
#
s¯ÿ
s“1
pisus
+
, (A.2)
where Π Ă ∆`` “ tpi P Rs¯`` :
řs¯
s“1 pis “ 1u is nonempty, compact in Rs¯, and convex.
(Π can be interpreted as a set of probability weights.) Given these restrictions on Π, the
minimization problem in (A.2) always has a solution and φ is strictly increasing.
A data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is said to be MEU-rationalizable if there is a function φ in
the collection ΦMEU of functions of the form (A.2), and a Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R`
such that, for each t, φpupxtq,pitq ě φpupxq,pitq for all x P Bt. By Theorem 1 in the Main
Text, this holds if and only if there exist Π and u¯ that solve (6), (7), and (8) in the Main
Text. We claim that this requirement can be reformulated in terms of the solvability of a
set of bilinear inequalities.
This is easy to see for the two-state case where we may assume, without loss of generality,
that there is pi1˚ and pi
˚˚
1 P p0, 1q such that Π “ tppi1, 1 ´ pi1q : pi1˚ ď pi1 ď pi˚˚1 u. Then it is
clear that φpu1, u2q “ pi1˚u1 ` p1 ´ pi1˚ qu2 if u1 ě u2 and φpu1, u2q “ pi˚˚1 u1 ` p1 ´ pi˚˚1 qu2 if
u1 ă u2. Consequently, for any px1, x2q P L, we have V px1, x2q “ pi1˚ u¯px1q ` p1´ pi1˚ qu¯px2q if
x1 ě x2 and V px1, x2q “ pi˚˚1 u¯px1q ` p1´ pi˚˚1 qu¯px2q if x1 ă x2 and this is independent of the
precise choice of u¯. Therefore, O is MEU-rationalizable if and only if we can find pi1˚ and
pi˚˚1 in p0, 1q, with pi1˚ ď pi˚˚1 , and an increasing function u¯ : X Ñ R` that solve (6) and (7)
in the Main Text. The requirement takes the form of a system of bilinear inequalities that
are linear in tu¯prqurPX after conditioning on pi1˚ and pi˚˚1 .
The result below covers the general case. The test involves solving a system of bilinear
inequalities in the variables p¯ispxq (for all s and x P L) and u¯prq (for all r P X ). Note that
p¯ipxq “ pp¯i1pxq, p¯i2pxq, . . . , p¯is¯pxqq is used to construct the set of priors Π (in (A.2)) and that
p¯ipxq is the distribution in Π that minimizes the expected utility of the bundle x (see (A.6)).
Proposition A.1. A data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is MEU-rationalizable if and only if there
is a function p¯i : LÑ ∆`` and a strictly increasing function u¯ : X Ñ R` such that
p¯ipxtq ¨ u¯pxtq ě p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq for all x P LXBt, (A.3)
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 p¯ipxtq ¨ u¯pxtq ą p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq for all x P LX pBtzBBtq, and (A.4)
p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq ď p¯ipx1q ¨ u¯pxq for all px,x1q P Lˆ L. (A.5)
If these conditions hold, O admits an MEU-rationalization where Π (in (A.2)) is the convex
hull of tp¯ipxquxPL, the Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R extends u¯, and
V pxq “ min
piPΠtpi ¨ u¯pxqu “ p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq for all x P L. (A.6)
Proof: Suppose that O is rationalizable by φ as defined by (A.2). For any x in the finite
lattice L, let p¯ipxq be an element in arg minpiPΠ pi ¨ upxq and let u¯ be the restriction of u to
X . Then it is clear that the conditions (A.3)–(A.5) hold.
Conversely, suppose that there is a function p¯i and a strictly increasing function u¯ obeying
the conditions (A.3)–(A.5). Define Π as the convex hull of tp¯ipxq : x P Lu; Π is a nonempty
and convex subset of ∆`` and it is compact in Rs¯ since L is finite. Suppose that there exists
x P L and pi P Π such that pi ¨ u¯pxq ă p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq. Since pi is a convex combination of
elements in tp¯ipxq : x P Lu, there must exist x1 P L such that p¯ipx1q ¨ u¯pxq ă p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq,
which contradicts (A.5). We conclude that p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq “ minpiPΠ pi ¨ u¯pxq for all x P L. We
define φ : Rs¯` Ñ R by φpuq “ minpiPΠ pi ¨ u. Then the conditions (A.3) and (A.4) are just
versions of (6) and (7) in the Main Text, and so Theorem 1 in the Main Text guarantees
that there is Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R` extending u¯ such that O is rationalizable by
V pxq “ φpupxqq. QED
A2.3 Variational preferences
A popular model of decision making under uncertainty which generalizes maxmin ex-
pected utility is variational preferences (VP), introduced by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini (2006). In this model, a bundle x P Rs¯` has utility V pxq “ φpupxqq, where
φpuq “ min
piP∆``
tpi ¨ u` cppiqu (A.7)
and c : ∆`` Ñ R` is a continuous and convex function with the following boundary condi-
tion: for any sequence pin P ∆`` tending to p˜i, with p˜is “ 0 for some s, we obtain cppinq Ñ 8.
This boundary condition, together with the continuity of c, guarantee that there is pi˚ P ∆``
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 that solves the minimization problem in (A.7).2 Therefore, φ is well-defined and strictly in-
creasing.
We say that O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is VP-rationalizable if there is a function φ in the collection
ΦV P of functions of the form (A.7), and a Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R` such that, for
each t, φpupxtq,pitq ě φpupxq,pitq for all x P Bt. By Theorem 1 in the Main Text, this holds
if and only if there exists a function c : ∆`` Ñ R` that is continuous, convex, and has the
boundary property, and an increasing function u¯ : X Ñ R` that together solve (6) and (7)
in the Main Text, with φ defined by (A.7). The following result is a reformulation of this
characterization that has a similar flavor to Proposition A.1; crucially, the necessary and
sufficient conditions on O are formulated as a finite set of bilinear inequalities.
Proposition A.2. A data set O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is VP-rationalizable if and only if there
is a function p¯i : L Ñ ∆``, a function c¯ : L Ñ R`, and a strictly increasing function
u¯ : X Ñ R` such that
p¯ipxtq ¨ u¯pxtq ` c¯pxtq ě p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq ` c¯pxq for all x P LXBt, (A.8)
p¯ipxtq ¨ u¯pxtq ` c¯pxtq ą p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq ` c¯pxq for all x P LX pBtzBBtq, and (A.9)
p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq ` c¯pxq ď p¯ipx1q ¨ u¯pxq ` c¯px1q for all px,x1q P Lˆ L. (A.10)
If these conditions hold, then O can be rationalized by a variational preference V , with φ
given by (A.7), such that the following holds:
(i) c : ∆`` Ñ R` satisfies cpp¯ipxqq “ c¯pxq for all x P L;
(ii) the Bernoulli function u : R` Ñ R satisfies u¯prq “ uprq for all r P X ; and
(iii) p¯ipxq P arg minpiP∆``tpi ¨ upxq ` cppiqu, leading to V pxq “ p¯ipxq ¨ u¯pxq ` c¯pxq, for all
x P L.
Proof: Suppose O is rationalizable by φ as defined by (A.7). Let u¯ be the restriction of
u to X . For any x in L, let p¯ipxq be an element in arg minpiP∆``tpi ¨ upxq ` cppiqu, and let
c¯pxq “ cpp¯ipxqq. Then it is clear that the conditions (A.8)–(A.10) hold.
2 Indeed, pick any p˜i P ∆`` and define S “ tpi P ∆`` : pi ¨ u ` cppiq ď p˜i ¨ u ` cpp˜iqu. The boundary
condition and continuity of c guarantee that S is compact in Rs¯ and hence arg minpiPStpi ¨ u ` cppiqu “
arg minpiP∆``tpi ¨ u` cppiqu is nonempty.
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 Conversely, suppose that there is a strictly increasing function u¯ and functions p¯i and c¯
obeying conditions (A.8)–(A.10). For every pi P ∆``, define c˜ppiq “ maxxPLtc¯pxq ´ ppi ´
p¯ipxqq ¨ u¯pxqu. It follows from (A.10) that c¯px1q ě c¯pxq ´ pp¯ipx1q ´ p¯ipxqq ¨ u¯pxq for all x P L.
Therefore, c˜pp¯ipx1qq “ c¯px1q for any x1 P L. The function c˜ is convex and continuous but
it need not obey the boundary condition. However, we know there is a function c defined
on ∆`` that is convex, continuous, obeys the boundary condition, with cppiq ě c˜ppiq for
all pi P ∆`` and cppiq “ c˜ppiq for pi P tp¯ipxq : x P Lu. We claim that, with c so defined,
minpiP∆``tpi ¨ u¯pxq ` cppiqu “ pipxq ¨ u¯pxq ` c¯pxq for all x P L. Indeed, for any pi P ∆``,
pi ¨ u¯pxq ` cppiq ě pi ¨ u¯pxq ` c˜ppiq ě pi ¨ u¯pxq ` c¯pxq ´ ppi ´ p¯ipxqq ¨ u¯pxq “ u¯pxq ` c¯pxq.
On the other hand, p¯ipxq ¨ upxq ` cpp¯ipxqq “ p¯ipxq ¨ upxq ` c¯pxq, which establishes the claim.
We define φ : Rs¯` Ñ R by (A.7); then (A.8) and (A.9) are just versions of (6) and (7) in the
Main Text, and so Theorem 1 in the Main Text guarantees that there is a Bernoulli function
u : R` Ñ R` extending u¯ such that O is rationalizable by V pxq “ φpupxqq. QED
A2.4 Models with budget-dependent reference points
So far in our discussion we have assumed that the agent has a preference over different
contingent outcomes, without being too specific as to what actually constitutes an outcome in
the agent’s mind. On the other hand, models such as prospect theory have often emphasized
the impact of reference points, and changing reference points, on decision making. Some of
these phenomena can be easily accommodated within our framework.
For example, imagine an experiment in which subjects are asked to choose from a con-
straint set of state contingent monetary prizes. Assuming that there are s¯ states and that
the subject never suffers a loss, we can represent each prize by a vector x P Rs¯`. The subject
is observed to choose xt from Bt Ă Rs¯`, so the data set is O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1. The standard
way of thinking about the subject’s behavior is to assume his choice from Bt is governed by
a preference defined on the prizes, which implies that the situation where he never receives a
prize (formally the vector 0) is the subject’s constant reference point. But a researcher may
well be interested in whether the subject has a different reference point or multiple reference
points that vary with the budget (and perhaps manipulable by the researcher). Most obvi-
ously, suppose that the subject has an endowment point ωt P Rs¯` and a classical budget set
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 Bt “ tx P Rs¯` : pt ¨ x ď pt ¨ ωtu. In this case, a possible hypothesis is that the subject will
evaluate different bundles in Bt based on a utility function defined on the deviation from
the endowment; in other words, the endowment is the subject’s reference point. Another
possible reference point is that bundle in Bt which gives the same payoff in every state.
Whatever it may be, suppose the researcher has a hypothesis about the possible reference
point at observation t, which we shall denote by et P Rs¯`, and that the subject chooses
according to some utility function V : r´K,8qs¯ Ñ R` where K ą 0 is sufficiently large
so that r´K,8qs¯ Ă Rs¯ contains all the possible reference point-dependent outcomes in the
data, i.e., the set
ŤT
t“1 B˜
t, where
B˜t “ tx1 P Rs¯ : x1 “ x´ et for some x P Btu.
Let tφp¨, tquTt“1 be a collection of functions, where φp¨, tq : r´K,8qs¯ Ñ R is increasing in
all of its arguments. We say that O “ tpxt, BtquTt“1 is rationalizable by tφp¨, tquTt“1 and the
reference points tetuTt“1 if there exists a Bernoulli function u : r´K,8q Ñ R` such that
φpupxt´etq, tq ě φpupx´etq, tq for all x P Bt. This is formally equivalent to saying that the
modified data set O1 “ tpxt´ et, B˜tquTt“1 is rationalizable by tφp¨, tquTt“1. Applying Theorem
1 in the Main Text, rationalizability holds if and only if there is a strictly increasing function
u¯ : X Ñ R` that obeys (6) and (7) in the Main Text, where
X “ tr P R : r “ xts ´ ets for some t, su Y t´Ku.
Therefore, we may test whether O is rationalizable by expected utility, or by any of the mod-
els described so far, in conjunction with budget dependent reference points. Note that a test
of rank dependent utility in this context is sufficiently flexible to accommodate phenomena
emphasized by cumulative prospect theory (see Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), such as a
Bernoulli function u : r´K,8q Ñ R that is S-shaped (and hence nonconcave) around 0 and
probabilities distorted by a weighting function.
A3. Description of GARP and F-GARP tests
In addition to the expected utility (EU), disappointment aversion (DA), and rank de-
pendent utility (RDU) models which we implement in the Main Text, there are other more
7
                            46 / 53
 basic notions of rationalizabiity that we also test. In this section, we describe these models
and their revealed preference tests.
A3.1 Locally nonsatiated utility
The locally nonsatiated utility model is the most permissive of the models that we con-
sider in the sense that all others are special cases. A utility function U : Rs¯` Ñ R is
locally nonsatiated if at every open neighborhood N of x P Rs¯`, there is y P N such that
Upyq ą Upxq. We say that a data set O “ tpxt,ptquTt“1 is rationalizable if it can be rational-
ized by a continuous and locally nonsatiated utility function.
Afriat’s (1967) Theorem tells us that O is rationalizable if and only if it obeys a con-
sistency condition known as the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP).3 Afriat
(1972, 1973) also shows that there is natural generalization of GARP that characterizes ratio-
nalizability at some efficiency index e, which we now describe. Let D “ txt : t “ 1, 2, . . . , T u;
in other words, D consists of those bundles that have been observed somewhere in the data
set. For bundles xt and xt
1
in D, xt is said to be revealed preferred to xt1 at the efficiency
index (or threshold) e (we denote this by xt ěe˚ xt
1
) if xt
1 P Btpeq, where Btpeq is given by
(12) in the Main Text;4 xt is said to be strictly revealed preferred to xt
1
(and we denote this
by xt ąe˚ xt
1
) if xt
1 P Btpeq and pt ¨xt1 ă ept ¨xt. O is rationalizable at the efficiency index e
if and only if, whenever there are observations ppti ,xtiq (for i “ 1, 2, . . . , n) in O satisfying
xt1 ěe˚ xt2 , xt2 ěe˚ xt3 , . . . , xtn´1 ěe˚ xtn , and xtn ěe˚ xt1 , (A.11)
then we cannot replace ěe˚ with ąe˚ anywhere in this chain; in other words, while there can
be revealed preference cycles in O, they cannot contain a strict revealed preference. This
property is a generalization of GARP, which is the special case where e “ 1. Checking
for this property is computationally undemanding: the (strict) revealed preference relations
on D can be easily constructed; once this has been established, we can apply Warshall’s
3 This term and its acronym were coined by Varian (1982), who also provides a proof of Afriat’s Theorem.
To be specific, the theorem says that GARP is necessary whenever the data set is rationalizable by a locally
nonsatiated utility function (continuity is not needed); conversely, when a data set obeys GARP, then it is
rationalizable by a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility function.
4 Our terminology differs a little from the standard, which refers to ěe˚ as the direct revealed preference
relation and uses revealed preference to refer to the transitive closure of this relation. Since our exposition
avoids any discussion of the transitive closure, we have adopted the simpler terminology here.
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 algorithm to compute the transitive closure of the revealed preference relations and then
check for the absence of cycles containing strict revealed preferences.
A3.2 Stochastically monotone utility
For x and y in Rs¯`, we write x ěFSD y if x first order stochastically dominates y (given
the payoffs and the objectively known probabilities) and write x ąFSD y if x ěFSD y and
the two distributions are distinct. One way of sharpening the locally nonsatiated utility
model is to require that the utility function U : Rs¯` Ñ R is stochastically monotone. By this
we mean that Upxq ą pěqUpyq whenever x ąFSD y (x ěFSD y). Note that the RDU, DA,
and EU models all obey this property.
In the Choi et al. (2007) experiment, there are two states; it is straightforward to check
that when pi1 “ pi2 “ 1{2, a utility function is stochastically monotone if and only if it
is strictly increasing and symmetric; when pi2 ą pi1, a utility function U is stochastically
monotone if and only if it is strictly increasing and Upa, bq ą Upb, aq whenever b ą a.
A data set O “ tpxt,ptquTt“1 is said to be rationalizable by the stochastically monotone
utility (SMU) model if there is a continuous and stochastically monotone utility function U
that rationalizes the observations. Since a utility function U that is stochastically monotone
will be strictly increasing, it is also locally nonsatiated. Hence any SMU-rationalizable data
set is also rationalizable by utility maximization but the converse is not true. Indeed, the
single observation given in Example 1 passes GARP trivially, but it cannot be rationalized
by any symmetric and strictly increasing utility function.
Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017) have recently developed a test for rationalizability by
the SMU model. The test can be thought of as a version of GARP, but with suitably modified
revealed preference relations. We say that the bundle xt is SMU-revealed preferred to xt
1
at
the efficiency threshold e (for xt and xt
1
in D) if there is a bundle y such that y P Btpeq
and y ěFSD xt1 ; this revealed preference is strict if y can be chosen to satisfy y ąFSD xt.
Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017) show that a data set is rationalizable by the SMU model
at a threshold e if and only if it does not admit SMU-revealed preference cycles (such as
(A.11)) containing strict SMU-revealed preferences; we call the latter property F-GARP (at
the efficiency threshold e), where ‘F’ stands for first order stochastic dominance. Clearly this
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 result is analogous to the characterization for basic rationalizability, except that the revealed
preferences are defined differently. With two states, the SMU-revealed preference relations
are easily obtained, and therefore checking F-GARP is also easy to implement.
A4. Confidence intervals on pass rates
pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95 e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95
GARP 0.81 r0.67, 0.91s 0.68 r0.53, 0.81s GARP 0.80 r0.66, 0.91s 0.63 r0.48, 0.77s
F-GARP 0.64 r0.49, 0.77s 0.49 r0.34, 0.64s F-GARP 0.72 r0.57, 0.84s 0.57 r0.41, 0.71s
RDU/DA 0.64 r0.49, 0.77s 0.49 r0.34, 0.64s RDU 0.72 r0.57, 0.84s 0.52 r0.37, 0.67s
DA 0.43 r0.29, 0.59s 0.26 r0.14, 0.41s
EU 0.64 r0.49, 0.77s 0.38 r0.25, 0.54s EU 0.39 r0.25, 0.55s 0.26 r0.14, 0.41s
Note: Each cell contains a pass rate and exact 95% confidence interval (in square brackets),
where the latter is obtained using the Clopper-Pearson procedure.
Table A.1: Pass rates and 95% confidence intervals
pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95 e “ 0.90 e “ 0.95
F-GARP 0.79 r0.63, 0.90s 0.72 r0.53, 0.86s F-GARP 0.89 r0.75, 0.97s 0.90 r0.73, 0.98s
RDU/DA 0.79 r0.63, 0.90s 0.72 r0.53, 0.86s RDU 0.89 r0.75, 0.97s 0.83 r0.64, 0.94s
DA 0.54 r0.37, 0.71s 0.41 r0.24, 0.61s
EU 0.79 r0.63, 0.90s 0.56 r0.38, 0.74s EU 0.49 r0.32, 0.66s 0.41 r0.24, 0.61s
Note: Each cell contains a pass rate and exact 95% confidence interval (in square brackets),
where the latter is obtained using the Clopper-Pearson procedure.
Table A.2: Pass rates and 95% confidence intervals (conditional on GARP)
A5. Bronars power calculation
In order to calculate the Bronars (1987) power, we need to generate random data sets.
As we described in the Main Text, this involves first producing budget sets in the same
random fashion as in the Choi et al. (2007) experiment itself, and then randomly selecting
bundles from these budget sets. In the case where we are interested in power unconditionally,
our algorithm simply selects bundles randomly uniformly from the frontiers of these budget
sets. While the unconditional procedure needs little explanation, the method for calculat-
ing conditional power, i.e., power conditional on passing the generalized axiom of revealed
preference (GARP) or F-GARP, requires further explanation.
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 The process of generating a random data set obeying GARP (F-GARP) at a given ef-
ficiency threshold is as follows. First, we generate 50 budget sets as in Choi et al. (2007).
Next, we select a budget line and randomly (uniformly) choose a bundle on that line. Then
we select a second budget line and randomly choose a bundle from that part of the line which
guarantees that this observation, along with the first, obeys GARP (F-GARP) at the given
efficiency threshold. A third budget line is then selected and a bundle randomly chosen from
that part of the line so that all three observations together obey GARP (F-GARP). Note
that such a bundle must exist; indeed, the demand (on the third budget line) arising from
any locally nonsatiated (stochastically monotone) utility function rationalizing the first two
observations will have this property. We then choose a fourth budget line and a bundle on
that line randomly so that the first four observations obey GARP (F-GARP), and so on.
We generate 30,000 data sets (with 50 observations each) which pass (GARP) F-GARP at
each of the two efficiency thresholds (0.9 and 0.95) in this manner,5 before subjecting each
data set to a test for a given model. By the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, in order to be
100p1´δq percent confident that the sample pass rate resulting from a simulation is within 
of the true probability of passing the test, we require at least N “ p1{22q log p2{δq samples;
with 30,000 samples, we can be 99.5 percent sure that our estimate of the Bronars power is
within 0.01 of the true value.
A6. Probability distortions in the RDU model
The RDU model generalizes the EU model by permitting a distortion of the objective
probabilities. With two states, the probability of the less favorable state is distorted to
be gppiq when pi is the true probability. In the asymmetric treatment of Choi et al. (2007)
analyzed in the Main Text, pi is either 1/3 or 2/3. It turns out that, at the 0.9 threshold, all of
the 15 subjects who fail EU but pass RDU continue to do so if we restrict gp2{3q P r0.55, 0.75s
and gp1{3q P r0.25, 0.45s. (Note that g may differ across subjects.) At the 0.95 threshold,
the same restrictions on the distorted probabilities capture 11 of the 12 subjects who pass
RDU and fail EU. So it seems that those who pass RDU do so with fairly modest distortions
of the true probabilities.
5 So there are four distinct collections of data sets, with each collection containing 30,000 data sets.
11
                            50 / 53
 Furthermore, there is some evidence that subjects deflate the probability of the less
favorable state when it is objectively 2/3 and inflate the probability when it is 1/3, so
that the cumulative probability weighting function has the shape favored by cumulative
prospect theory. Indeed, if we restrict ourselves to choosing gp2{3q P r0.55, 2{3s and gp1{3q P
r1{3, 0.45s, we still manage to capture every subject who passes the RDU test at the 0.9
threshold and all but two who pass at the 0.95 threshold. On the other hand, the mirror
restriction performs very badly: if we insist on choosing gp2{3q P r2{3, 0.75s and gp1{3q P
r0.25, 1{3s, the RDU model captures no subject at either efficiency threshold other than
those who are already EU-rationalizable. (Note that for any subject who passes RDU,
there will typically be more than one set of distorted probabilities at which the subject is
rationalizable.)
We know from Table 2 in the Main Text that, for the symmetric treatment the pass rates
of the EU and RDU/DA models differ only at the efficiency threshold 0.95, where 5 subjects
pass RDU/DA but fail EU. All 5 subjects pass the RDU test for some gp1{2q ă 0.5, which
is consistent with disappointment aversion, and 4 of them pass with values of gp1{2q chosen
from the interval r0.45, 0.5q.
A7. Statistical analysis of Selten index differences
A statistical analysis of the differences in the Selten indices conditional on GARP is
provided in Table A.3. (Table A.4 provides the same analysis after conditioning on F-
GARP.) Each entry in the table gives the p-value of the test of null hypothesis that the two
models have the same Selten index, with the alternative hypothesis that they do not. To
illustrate how this test is carried out, consider a test of the equality of the Selten indices
between the EU and SMU models, under the asymmetric treatment and at the efficiency
threshold 0.9. As shown in Table 4, the SMU model has a power of 0.88 and the EU model
has a power of 1; we take this as given. The null hypothesis that the Selten indices are equal
is equivalent to the hypothesis that µSMU ´µEU “ 1´0.88 “ 0.12, where µEU and µSMU are
the expected conditional pass rates for the EU and SMU models. The alternative hypothesis
is µSMU ´µEU ‰ 0.12. The sample estimate of µSMU ´µEU has a binomial distribution and
its realized value is p33 ´ 18q{37; according to Table A.3, the probability of obtaining this
sample estimate or something more extreme if µSMU ´ µEU “ 0.12 is effectively zero.
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 pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e
“
0.
9
5 F-GARP RDU/DA
e
“
0
.9
5 F-GARP RDU DA
RDU/DA 1.000 ¨ RDU 0.432 ¨ ¨
DA 0.000 0.000 ¨
EU 0.000 0.000 EU 0.000 0.000 1.000
e
“
0.
9
0 F-GARP RDU/DA
e
“
0
.9
0 F-GARP RDU DA
RDU/DA 1.000 ¨ RDU 0.005 ¨ ¨
DA 0.002 0.000 ¨
EU 1.000 1.000 EU 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Each cell contains a p-value, with values below 0.05 italicized.
Table A.3: Pairwise differences in predictive success
(conditional on GARP)
pi1 “ 1{2 pi1 ‰ 1{2
e
“
0
.9
5 RDU/DA
e
“
0.
95 RDU DA
DA 0.000 ¨
EU 0.000 EU 0.000 1.000
e
“
0
.9
0 RDU/DA
e
“
0.
90 RDU DA
DA 0.000 ¨
EU 0.003 EU 0.000 0.000
Note: Each cell contains a p-value.
Table A.4: Pairwise differences in predictive success
(conditional on F-GARP)
Notice that, in the asymmetric case, the differences in Selten indices between the RDU
model and the more restrictive DA and EU models are all statistically significant. This is
true after conditioning on GARP, and also after conditioning on F-GARP (see Tables A.3
and A.4 respectively).
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